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ABSTRACT: Evictions cause substantial harm to lower-income families. The effects range
from homelessness to job loss, school turnover, and deteriorating health. Previously evicted
tenants can be pushed down-market and forced to accept substandard housing. Housing subsidy
might be expected to reduce eviction rates and provide greater stability. However, little
systematic research has examined the eviction rates of subsidized, affordable rental properties
and compared them to nonsubsidized, market-rate properties. We examine eviction filings for
multifamily rental buildings in five-county metropolitan Atlanta, using a data set of eviction
filings, property characteristics, and ownership information. We identify the subset of buildings
that are subsidized and distinguish between senior and nonsenior properties. We find that senior,
subsidized multifamily properties have substantially lower eviction rates than market-rate
properties. A senior-subsidized multifamily rental building is expected to have an annual
eviction rate that is 10.7 percentage points below a nonsenior, market-rate property; this result is
significant p < 0.01, and compares to a mean eviction filing rate of 16.3 percent (16.3 evictions
per 100 rental units). On the other hand, a nonsenior-subsidized building is expected to have an
eviction rate that is 1.4 percentage points lower than a nonsenior, market-rate building; this result
is not statistically significant. It is important to note that we do not have data on the economic
characteristics of tenants, and that may account for some of the relatively high eviction rates of
the nonsenior-affordable properties. We discuss implications of these findings for further
research and housing policy and practice.
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Introduction
Stable and affordable housing is a key concern to policymakers in the U.S. Much of U.S.
housing research has focused on the provision of affordable rental housing, particularly for
lower-income families. Until recently, much less attention was focused on forced displacement
of tenants through the eviction process. Evictions were viewed by many housing researchers as a
“hidden problem” because little systemic data were being collected on a local or national level
(Hartman & Robinson, 2003). In recent years, however, research on evictions has grown.
Evictions, both formal and informal, are a key source of housing instability faced by
lower-income renters in the U.S. As the number of lower-income renters has swelled, the supply
of low-cost rental housing has declined (La Jeunesse at al., 2019). Eviction is a fairly frequent
occurrence for renters in the U.S., especially among lower-income families. Approximately 15
percent of children in large U.S. cities born from 1998 to 2000 experienced at least one eviction
before age 15 (Lundberg & Donnelly, 2018). One factor behind evictions is the mismatch
between the need for low-cost rental units and the supply of such housing. Federal housing
support for poor households has not increased in recent decades as demand by lower-income
households has grown. As a result, the share of eligible low-income families receiving housing
assistance declined from 24 percent to 21 percent from 2005 to 2015 (Kingsley, 2017). From
1999 to 2015, the share of renters that were severely rent-burdened increased from 19 to 25
percent (Kingsley, 2017). The strong competition for affordable units means that more landlords
can afford to turn away prospective tenants with evictions on their records, so that evictions can
make it even more difficult to find affordable housing.
Substantial literature in recent years has found that evictions are associated with greater
family instability, homelessness, job loss, and mental and physical health (Desmond, 2012,
2

Desmond et al., 2013, Desmond, 2014, Rohe et al., 2016, and Gold, 2016). Tenants who have
been evicted can find themselves pushed down-market, compelled to accept worse-quality
housing, sometimes in less desirable neighborhoods. Renters experiencing forced moves ended
up in neighborhoods with significantly higher poverty and crime rates than renters who moved
voluntarily (Desmond & Shollenberger, 2015). Moreover, troubled eviction histories can
effectively bar tenants from future eligibility for subsidized housing, making it harder to attain
affordable housing (Desmond, 2012). Eviction is associated with subsequent unstable housing
situations. Desmond (2012) found that 53 percent of renters being evicted didn’t know where
they would live next, while only 15 percent had found a new place to rent. Other evicted families
relied on friends, hotels, and shelters. Furthermore, after experiencing an eviction, renters are
twenty percentage points more likely to have stability issues in their next house or apartment
(Desmond, Gershenson, & Kiviat, 2015).
Eviction can also have negative impacts on employment. Tenants in low-wage jobs often
have difficulty getting time off of work to search for new housing, and once new housing is
found it may become more difficult to keep the same job (Desmond, 2015; Hartman &
Robinson, 2003). In a study of Milwaukee renters, Desmond and Gershenson (2016) found that
renters who were forced to move were between 11 and 25 percent more likely to lose their jobs
than comparable workers with stable housing.
One important aspect of evictions and rental housing dynamics that has received little
attention in the research is the relationship between housing subsidies and eviction rates.
Subsidized, affordable housing developments are often presumed to provide an environment for
stable, low-eviction housing for lower-income renters (Desmond, 2016; Thomas, 2017). This is a
reasonable presumption. Greater affordability via lower rents should be expected to result in
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lower eviction rates as compared to market-rate housing. This is especially the case where the
subsidies require rents to be set at some maximum share of income (e.g. 30 percent). However,
there are two issues here. First, renters eligible for subsidized affordable units typically are
relatively low-income families, meeting program requirements where incomes are typically no
more than 60 percent or less of the metropolitan median income (e.g., in the case of the Low
Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC), the most common type of subsidized multifamily rental
unit). These households, especially if not retired or on some sort of fixed income, are often
precariously employed and may experience significant income volatility. Tenants who are on
fixed incomes may be somewhat less vulnerable to economic downturns and associated income
volatility. The second issue is that, in the case of LIHTC units, rents are not limited to 30 percent
of the tenant’s income but are set to not exceed 30 percent of the income of someone making the
maximum allowable income, which is usually 60 percent of the area median income. Thus, if a
tenant is making an income that is less than this, their rent burden ratio can be substantially
greater than 30 percent of their income.
We have, to date, almost no systematic evidence on the eviction rates of subsidized
housing properties. One very recent paper uses a data set of about 1,300 families from 16 cities
from the Fragile Families and Child Wellbeing Study, and finds that public housing, but not
other forms of housing subsidy, has a negative impact on eviction rates during the 2000s
(Lundberg et al, 2020). Their data data does not distinguish other forms of subsidy outside of
public housing, but they imply that most of the “other assistance” families are receiving Housing
Choice Vouchers. They suggest that public housing is more effective than other forms of subsidy
at reducing eviction rates due to differences in the eviction process for public housing or due to
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public housing more effectively reducing rent burdens than other forms of housing subsidy, a
point that we will return to later in our discussion.
The largest subsidized housing program in the U.S., the LIHTC, does not regularly track
eviction rates of its properties. In this paper, we look to develop some of the first systematic
empirical evidence on the eviction rates of supply-side affordable housing subsidies. More
specifically we ask the question, controlling for neighborhood, building, and locational
characteristics, do subsidized multifamily rental properties have lower eviction rates than
market-rate properties? And, if so, what is the degree of difference? We also examine
specifically the differences between the eviction rates of senior-subsidized rental properties and
nonsenior-subsidized properties. Unfortunately, we do not have data on the economic
characteristics of tenants, at the building level, in either subsidized or market-rate properties, so
we are unable to fully account for why the eviction rates of the two types of properties differ (or
do not) to the extent that they do. Nonetheless, this paper provides some of the first evidence on
the differences between the eviction rates of subsidized and market-rate multifamily buildings.
While eviction is only one outcome of concern for those interested in providing
affordable housing, the recent accumulation of the evidence that eviction causes makes it an
increasingly important consideration for designing housing policies and programs, especially
given the substantial amount of evidence we now have on the harms that evictions can cause for
families. While, ideally, we would also measure the relationship between tenant-based subsidies
(tenant vouchers) and eviction rates, we were not able to obtain address-level data on tenantbased vouchers.

Factors Associated with Higher Eviction Rates
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Researchers have found various household neighborhood, building, and tenant
characteristics to be associated with higher eviction rates. A number of studies find strong
associations between evictions and neighborhood racial composition, with Black neighborhoods
often having substantially higher eviction rates (Desmond, 2012; Raymond et al., 2018; Shelton,
2017). Teresa (2018) found that Black neighborhoods in Richmond, Virginia had substantially
higher eviction filings, with the eviction filing rate increasing by 1.2 percent for every 10 percent
increase in the Black population. At the same time, neighborhood poverty rate and median
income were not significant predictors of eviction rates. In Atlanta, Raymond et al. (2018) also
found that the Black neighborhoods had higher eviction filings controlling for other
neighborhood characteristics. The clustering of evictions in Black neighborhoods is not
surprising given that survey-based evidence shows that evictions disproportionately affect Black
households. Thirty percent of evicted tenants in Milwaukee were Black women, while Black
women comprised only 9.6 percent of the city’s population (Desmond, 2012). In King County,
Washington, Thomas (2017) found that evictions were filed against Black renters at four times
the rate of white renters. In a study of Milwaukee tenants, Greenberg, Gershenson and Desmond
(2016) found that Latinos living in neighborhoods where more than two-thirds of the population
was white were more likely to suffer an eviction. Additionally, they found that Latino tenants
with non-Latino landlords were at an increased risk of eviction.
The number of children in a household in Milwaukee was a significant predictor of
eviction (Desmond and Gershon, 2017). Desmond et al. (2013) found that for every one
percentage-point increase in the share of the population that were children, there was an
associated 6.5% increase in a neighborhood’s eviction cases, controlling for race, gender,
household composition, and socioeconomic status.
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In a study of metropolitan Atlanta, Immergluck et al. (2019) found that nonserial eviction
filing rates are associated with several building and neighborhood characteristics.i They found
that smaller and older multifamily buildings, other things equal, had higher eviction rates. Also,
buildings that had been sold recently had higher eviction rates, other things equal. A sale in the
prior three years was associated with an eviction filing rate that was between 4.2 and 4.7
percentage points higher, compared to a mean rate of 16 percent for all buildings. The authors
also found that the share of cost-burdened renters in a block group was positively associated with
the eviction rate of a building and, like some other literature, that the share of neighborhood
renters who were Black was strongly and positively associated with the eviction rate. Finally, the
block group educational level was also negatively associated with the eviction rate.
Only a small share of the eviction literature examines the relationship between housing
subsidy and evictions. This is somewhat surprising given that a chief goal of providing
subsidized rental housing is to reduce housing instability and insecurity. One recent study that
addressed the relationship between housing subsidy and eviction focused on urban mothers in a
15-year study (Donnelly et al., 2017). Mothers receiving housing assistance were less likely to
face an eviction. This paper is one of the few to compare families receiving various types of
housing assistance to unsubsidized households and how that seems to affect eviction rates. In
another paper, Montgomery et al. (2017) focused on veterans participating in HUD’s Veteran
Assistance Support Housing (HUD-VASH) program. The authors looked at eviction risk once
veterans left the program and found that receiving program assistance resulted in lower eviction
rates. In a study of eviction filings in Philadelphia, Goldstein et al. (2019) find that the
Philadelphia Housing Authority (PHA) properties accounted for between nine and thirteen
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percent of eviction filings since 2010, while accounting for about five percent of the city’s rental
stock. PHA’s tenants are predominantly very low income.
While they did not analyze eviction rates, Brisson and Covert (2015) examined the rental
nonpayment rates of tenants of the national nonprofit, Mercy Housing, across the country. They
found different rates of lease violations among tenants in their family, supportive and senior
housing programs. Unfortunately, this study did not provide direct measures in comparison to
otherwise similar, unsubsidized properties. However, the authors did find that tenants in the
family housing units had the highest rates of lease violations across the different types of rental
housing.
Overall, there has been little research published on the differences in eviction rates
between subsidized and unsubsidized, market-rate rental properties. While we expect housing
subsidy to reduce eviction rates, most subsidized housing operators have to address nonpayment
of rent through some means, often including eviction. The extent to which housing subsidy
reduces eviction rates is not well established and should be an important consideration in
designing and managing subsidized housing programs.

Examining Differences in Eviction Rates Among Subsidized and Market-Rental Rental
Properties in Metropolitan Atlanta
In order to examine factors associated with the eviction activity we utilized a database of
address-level data on eviction filings for the five core counties of the Atlanta metropolitan area
for 2016. These data were acquired from county court websites for a series of articles in the
Atlanta Journal Constitution on evictions (Joyner, Ernsthausen, and Mariano, 2018). It should be
noted that these data strictly cover formal eviction proceedings, which only account for a subset
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of all forms of forced residential displacement (Desmond & Shollenberger, 2015). In addition to
the eviction court records, data on building characteristics were obtained from tax assessor parcel
files for each of the five counties, which enabled us to identify the multifamily (5 units or more)
residential buildings and link them to eviction filings. Then, we obtained real estate sales data by
parcel number and linked it to the tax assessor parcel and eviction data. We used these data to
identify the recent sales history for the multifamily properties.
We also obtained lists of subsidized multifamily rental properties in the region from two
sources: the National Housing Preservation Database (https://preservationdatabase.org/) and the
HUD multifamily contracts database
(https://www.hud.gov/program_offices/housing/mfh/exp/mfhdiscl). These included buildings in
the following categories of subsidy: LIHTC, Section 8 (project based), Section 202/811, Section
515, HOME, Public Housing, and HUD-subsidized. If a property was indicated as falling into
any of these categories during 2016, the property was classified as “subsidized.” Because over 85
percent of the subsidized buildings were LIHTC properties (some of these buildings included
other subsidies as well), no attempt was made to distinguish the relationship of different types of
subsidy and eviction rates, as sample sizes would be too small for most subsidy types. Finally,
using building websites, we examined all subsidized properties to determine whether they were
age-restricted senior housing. For more information on the data used, a table detailing each data
item, source, and variable is located below.

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
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In order to identify any potential market-rate buildings that were also senior, agerestricted properties, we contacted two experts in the multifamily rental industry in Atlanta.
These include a principal with a larger developer of predominantly LIHTC senior-subsidized
properties that has just recently begun developing market-rate senior properties, and a principal
of a market-research real estate consultancy that does substantial work in the multifamily rental
sector. Both experts pointed to just a handful of senior, market-rate multifamily rental
developments, although the consultancy principal pointed out that this industry niche was
growing in the region (Cooke, 2019; Laube, 2019). Of the 10 projects that these experts pointed
to, most were not developed and occupied by 2016. We identified only four senior-market rate
buildings out of the 1,712 market-rate buildings in our data set.
Figure 1 provides a map of the location of the multifamily rental properties throughout
the 5-county region, with non-senior subsidized, and senior-subsidized properties specially colorcoded. The five core counties of the Atlanta region account for 67 percent of the metropolitan
area’s population and 88 percent of the multifamily rental units in the region. Compared to other
large metropolitan areas in the U.S., the Atlanta metropolitan area suffers from high eviction
filing and eviction rates (Immergluck et al., 2019).

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

Evictions in multifamily buildings in the five-county region accounted for more than
95,000 out of more than 132,000 total eviction filings in 2016, with the difference being filings
on single-family (one-to-four unit) properties. Therefore, multifamily filings account for more
than 70 percent of all filings in the area. The 95,000 filings occurred in 1,861 multifamily
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properties. The average property contained approximately 200 rental units, ranging from 5 to
more than 1,700 units. The average annual eviction filing rate per building was 28 filings per
100 rental units.
We distinguish between “serial” and “nonserial” eviction filings. Serial filings are those
when a particular tenant in a building receives more than one filing within a one-year period. We
focus here, instead, on nonserial eviction filings, which are much more likely to result in the
eventual eviction of a tenant (Garboden and Rosen, 2019; Leung et al., 2019). Judgement data
from all five counties of interest was not accessible or easily linked to parcel and building data.
We calculate an eviction filing rate by simply taking the number of total filings for the year
minus the number of serial filings. The nonserial eviction filing rate—the key outcome variable
of interest here and from this point referred to as the “eviction rate”—is the annual number of
nonserial eviction filings divided by the number of rental units in the building. The average
eviction rate for 2016 was 16.3 per 100 units. The interquartile range for the rate was from 6 to
22 per 100 units.
A variety of neighborhood and building characteristics, including location, age, and size
of a building may explain away much of the difference in building-level eviction rates. The
primary goal here is to identify whether, after controlling for these characteristics, the fact that a
building is subsidized for affordable housing purposes is associated with a lower eviction rate.
We first look at whether subsidy status, in and of itself, is associated with different eviction rates.
Then, in a separate regression, we distinguish between senior-subsidized and nonseniorsubsidized buildings and see if these two different types of subsidized properties are associated
with different eviction rates.
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We estimate a model for the eviction rate (nonserial eviction filings/rental units) for a
building, Y,

Y =  + X + N +L +S + 




where X is a set of building characteristics, including the number of units in the building, the
appraised value per unit in 2016,ii the age of the building, and a set of dummy variables
indicating whether the building was sold in the same year, a prior year, or two to three years ago.
Our prior is that the sale of a building may result in a rise in eviction filings as some owners raise
rents, possibly after upgrading the property. N is a set of block group-level characteristics, which
are chosen based on the previous literature, including the share of rental households who are
housing-cost burdened, median gross rent, poverty rate, the share of households that are femaleheaded families, the share of adults over 25 who are college-educated, the share of households
with children, the share of renters who are 65 or over, the share of renters who are Black, the
share of renters who are Latino, and the share of renters who are Asian. L is a set of spatial
dummy control variables indicating which of the 36 different Atlanta Regional Commission
super districts the property is located within. These are included to account for spatial clustering
within the five-county metro. Each county contains from 4 (Clayton) to 12 (Fulton) super
districts. Finally, S is a set of one or two dummy variables (depending on the version of the
model employed) that indicate the subsidy status of the property, i.e., whether it is a subsidized
housing property and, in another model, whether it is a senior-subsidized or a nonseniorsubsidized rental property. We also include a dummy variable for the small number (4) of
properties that are senior, market-rate buildings.

Results and Discussion
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We first examine differences in eviction rates across three different subsets of the
multifamily rental properties, including nonsenior, market-rate buildings, nonsenior-subsidized
buildings, and senior-subsidized buildings. Table 2 provides the means for each of these three
subgroups as well as the result of two independent-sample t-tests. The first t-test is between the
nonsenior, market-rate buildings (n=1,708) and senior, market-rate buildings (n=4). The second
one is between the nonsenior, market-rate buildings and the nonsenior-subsidized properties
(n=123). Finally, the third t-test is between the nonsenior, market-rate buildings and the seniorsubsidized properties (n=26).

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Table 2 indicates that the mean eviction rate for the four senior, market-rate buildings
(1.54 per 100 units) is far smaller than the mean for nonsenior, market-rate buildings (16.28 per
100 units). However, due to the small number of senior, market-rate buildings, this difference is
not significant at p < 0.05. The mean eviction rate for nonsenior-subsidized buildings (18.72 per
100 units) is slightly higher than the mean rate for market-rate buildings (16.28 per 100 units).
However, the difference of 2.43 per 100 units is not significant at p < 0.05. Finally, when
comparing senior-subsidized buildings to market-rate properties, the mean eviction rate among
senior-subsidized buildings is less than half that of market-rate properties (7.55 versus 16.28 per
100 units), and this difference is statistically significant.
We then turn to estimations of equation 1, which are developed in three stages. Table 3
provides the descriptive statistics for the 1,844 properties in the estimations of equation 1. Table
3 then provides the regression results. In the first set of results in Table 4, labeled Model 1, the
eviction rate is estimated without any attempt to distinguish between subsidized and market-rate
13

multifamily buildings. Then, in Model 2, a dummy variable is added to the model to indicate
whether the building is subsidized or not. Finally, in Model 3, in place of one single “subsidized”
dummy variable, two separate dummies are used, one indicating that the building is a nonseniorsubsidized property, and the second to indicate that it is a senior-subsidized property. We use the
three stages to identify the relationship between the subsidy status of a building and the eviction
rate, and in particular, whether senior, subsidized buildings seem to have different eviction rates
than nonsenior-subsidized buildings.

TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE

TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

Clustered-robust standard errors were used and clustered at the block-group level due to
the use of block-group-level neighborhood characteristics. No substantial multicollinearity
problems were detected. Only two variance inflation factors (VIFs) exceeded 5, and none
exceeded 7. These two VIFs were for the share of renters who are Black and the share of adults
with a college education. The share of renters who are Black is highly significant, so
multicollinearity is not a concern there. The education variable is close to being statistically
significant, however, and a larger sample size might result in statistical significance.
The results for most of the variables in the regressions in Table 4 are largely consistent
with the existing literature. Three neighborhood characteristics are significantly associated with
the eviction rate: the share of those cost burdened, the share of Black renters, and the share of
Asian renters. The share of renters who are cost-burdened is positively associated with eviction
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rate. A ten percentage-point (or, one-tenth) increase in the share of renters who are cost-burdened
is associated, other things equal, with a 0.63 percentage-point increase in the eviction rate, which
is a modest amount compared to a mean annual eviction rate of 16.3 percent (16.3 evictions per
100 rental units).
As shown in much of the existing literature, evictions are heavily racialized. Each ten
percentage-point increase in the block group share of renters who are Black, other things equal,
is associated with a 0.89 percentage point increase in the eviction rate. This means that going
from a predominantly nonblack to a predominantly Black tract, other things equal, is associated
with a substantial increase in the eviction rate. Also, neighborhoods with larger Asian renter
populations, other things equal, are associated with lower eviction rates.
Some building characteristics are significantly associated with eviction rates. Larger
buildings, other things equal, are expected to have lower eviction rates than smaller buildings.
Every 50 additional units is associated with an eviction rate that is 0.38 percentage points lower.
Older buildings are also associated with higher eviction rates. Every 10 years in additional
building age is associated with a 0.75 percentage-point higher eviction rate, other things equal. A
sale of the building in any of the three prior years is associated with more than a four percentagepoint increase in the eviction rate, a relatively large amount.
The key focus of this paper is on the association between subsidy status and evictions.
The results of Model 2 suggest that subsidized buildings have significantly lower eviction rates,
other things equal, than nonsenior, market-rate buildings. The results suggest that a subsidized
property, other things equal, is expected to have a 2.8 percentage-point lower eviction rate.
However, Model 2 groups all subsidized properties together and does not distinguish between
senior-subsidized and other subsidized properties. Lower-income seniors may be expected to
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suffer from lower eviction rates than other lower-income families, especially because lowincome seniors are likely to have less volatile income streams consisting of social security or
other retirement sources. Meanwhile, lower-income families are more vulnerable to layoffs and
fluctuations in family incomes.
Therefore, in Model 3, we distinguish between senior-subsidized and nonseniorsubsidized properties. We also include a dummy variable for the four senior, market-rate
buildings. The results show that senior-subsidized buildings, as well as senior, market-rate
buildings, have significantly and markedly lower eviction rates than nonsenior, market-rate
properties. Other things equal, a senior-subsidized building is expected to have a 10.7
percentage-point lower eviction rate than a market-rate building. This result is highly statistically
significant.
The result for nonsenior subsidized property is quite different, however. A nonseniorsubsidized building is expected to have only a 1.4 percentage-point lower eviction rate than a
market-rate building, other things equal, and this result is not statistically significant. However,
this result might conceivably become statistically significant if the sample size of nonsenior
subsidized properties (123 buildings) was substantially larger. This finding may be somewhat
counterintuitive if we expect supply-side subsidy, such as the LIHTC, to have a substantial
dampening effect on eviction rates. At the same time, as discussed below, we are unable to
control for the income and socioeconomic mix of the tenants at the building, and the tenants in
subsidized properties, on average, will tend to have lower incomes and likely be more vulnerable
to economic shocks than tenants of market-rate buildings.

Conclusion
16

Previous research demonstrates high multi-family eviction rates in Atlanta, across
property types. (Immergluck et al., 2019). The findings in this paper expand our knowledge on
eviction rates, specifically looking at the impacts of affordability and senior housing. The finding
that senior, subsidized rental properties have substantially lower eviction rates than nonsenior,
market-rate buildings, other variables held equal, is perhaps unsurprising. Low-income seniors
are likely to have relatively stable, if still low, incomes compared to working-age families.
Moreover, the regulated, lower rents of subsidized properties provide tenants with more
affordability and some protection from large rent increases.
Interpreting the finding that nonsenior-subsidized buildings do not have substantially
lower eviction rates than nonsenior, market-rate buildings is complicated by the fact that, while
we are able to control for a great many characteristics about each building, including age, size,
location, and racial and economic characteristics of renters at the block group level, we are not
able to control directly for the tenant incomes of the properties. One likely contributor to the
perhaps unexpectedly high eviction rates of the subsidized properties is that they are incomerestricted so that tenants are likely to be more vulnerable to economic shocks and income
declines, making them, in turn, more vulnerable to eviction. However, these buildings also have
lower, limited rents set at levels that are intended to be subsidized for lower-income tenants.
Thus, it may be that the design of the subsidy structure of some or most of these subsidized
properties are not terribly effective at addressing the unstable economic lives of many of their
tenants. This is consistent with the finding of Lundberg et al. (2020) that found that public
housing had a substantial negative effect on eviction probabilities but that other forms of housing
assistance did not.
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Subsidized properties generally have lower rents than market-rate buildings. The bulk of
these properties are LIHTC buildings, where rents are generally set at rents that affordable to
those with incomes at or below 60 percent of the metropolitan area median income. At the same
time, however, the lower-income families in these properties may be more vulnerable
economically than the typical tenant of market-rate rental buildings, which tend to draw from a
broader socioeconomic spectrum of tenants. Tenants in subsidized properties, especially
nonsenior buildings, are likely to be more vulnerable to layoffs, economic downturns, and a wide
variety of economic stressors than are renters overall.
In addition, unlike housing vouchers and some other affordable rental programs, the
LIHTC program does not limit gross rent to 30 percent of the tenant’s income. This means that
tenants with incomes below the 60 percent of area median income threshold will tend to pay
greater than 30 percent of their income towards rent. Also, if their incomes decline, their rent is
not reduced accordingly, unless they also hold a housing voucher or some other sort of incomesensitive subsidy. These realities point to a systemic response that could look similar to a
program that the City of Philadelphia is considering. The new pilot program would provide
“gap” rent vouchers of up to $300 per month, to decrease rent burden amongst tenants of taxcredit or other publicly financed properties (Blumgart, 2020).
In terms of further research, there is a need for data that provide information on the tenant
characteristics (especially income) of different buildings, including market-rate properties.
Subsidized rental properties that are not age-restricted do not have the same mix of tenants that
the typical market-rate rental property does. Again, tenants in subsidized properties may be more
vulnerable to adversities such as discrimination in labor markets, layoffs, weak wage growth, and
cyclical or structural unemployment. Better data on tenants could help isolate the extent to which
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housing subsidy programs are effective at buffering residents from eviction pressures.
Regardless, the evidence put forward in this paper supports arguments for increased financial
supports to enable greater housing stability for tax-credit tenants.
Ideally, future research on this topic would utilize data on income and race for each
tenant in all properties, not just LIHTC buildings. There are numerous barriers to getting such
data. For one, while such data are collected for LIHTC buildings they are generally not publicly
reported at the building level (O’Regan and Horn, 2013). This is partly a legacy of the LIHTC
program being administered by the IRS and not by HUD. Moreover, the data on LIHTC tenants
that are collected by the state housing finance agencies generally only cover the subsidized units
and not any market-rate units in the development. More fundamentally, market-rate properties
generally do not collect such information and if property managers tried to do so, they would
potentially create privacy concerns among tenants. Further work on this topic, which attempted
to control for tenant characteristics. would most likely be accomplished through tenant surveys
of both subsidized and market-rate properties, ideally at a scale that could enable generalizability
across building type and space. Alternatively, qualitative interview-based research on landlords
and tenants may be useful to informing these issues.
Research similar to the work here should be conducted in other metropolitan areas in
other states. Metropolitan Atlanta is a high-eviction region in a state with few tenant protections
and a landlord-friendly eviction process (Hatch, 2017). Additionally, the difference between
market-rate rents and LIHTC rents is unlikely to be as large in the Atlanta market as compared to
higher-cost markets such as many on the East and West Coasts. In such metros, LIHTC rents are
likely to be lower relative to market rents than in Atlanta. Thus, the program may be relatively
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more effective in reducing evictions in higher-cost markets because it offers a relatively greater
reduction in rents compared to market rents.
Finally, there is also a need to do more research on the role of tenant-based housing
assistance, especially Housing Choice Vouchers, on eviction rates as compared to supply-side
subsidies such as the LIHTC. Much of the focus in comparing supply-side versus demand-side
programs has focused on the impact on affordability levels and on the production efficiency of
the various programs. More attention is needed to the differential impacts of the different
subsidized housing approaches and programs on rental stability and, in particular, the incidence
of evictions.
Given the evidence on the harms that evictions cause to families and children, the fact
that nonsenior-subsidized rental properties have eviction rates similar to the high rates of
nonsenior, market-rate buildings is some cause for concern, given the unusually high baseline
rates in Atlanta. Of course, providing lower, more affordable rents to low-income families is a
laudable outcome of housing subsidy programs. If such programs continue to suffer from
relatively high eviction rates, however, policymakers and affordable housing practitioners may
want to reexamine the design and implementation of these subsidy programs and consider
additional emphasis on reducing evictions and increasing housing stability, as well as
affordability. This may mean focusing more on program designs that address the volatility of
low-income families’ incomes, including favoring programs that lower effective rents as tenant
incomes decline.
Beyond any fundamental redesign of affordable housing subsidy programs, these results
imply that current supply-side subsidy programs, by themselves, may not be sufficient tools for
reducing evictions markedly to address a key aspect of housing stability, at least for nonsenior
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families. It may be that LIHTC and other programs should be modified to focus more on
providing greater opportunities to mitigate evictions. State housing finance authorities (HFAs)
might consider providing points in their Qualified Allocation Plans to developers who promise to
maintain eviction mitigation programs, which might include access to short- or medium-term
financial support to families undergoing financial hardship. Moreover, states should take existing
IRS regulations to enforce “good-cause” eviction requirements in LIHTC buildings seriously.
The National Housing Law Project (NHLP) argues that state housing finance agencies should
more aggressively enforce this federal requirement (National Housing Law Project, 2018). They
point to California’s requirement that all LIHTC properties have a good-cause lease rider
together with a letter informing tenants of their rights under this regulation. Wisconsin and
Massachusetts reference the good-cause requirements in their regulatory agreements. Yet, NHLP
argues that many states fail to implement the good-cause requirements in any meaningful way.
While the effects of such actions are unknown at this time, and many evictions may be initiated
simply for failure to pay rent (generally acceptable under good-cause requirements), this is an
additional step that might be considered to improve housing stability in subsidized properties.
During the mortgage crisis, a number of states and localities, sometimes with federal
support, provided short- or medium-term assistance to homeowners undergoing financial stress.
Some nonprofit programs exist to provide short-term assistance to renters, but they are frequently
inadequately funded. Developers might team up with such nonprofits or with local government
to provide such assistance. In addition, state HFAs should be careful in their underwriting so as
to not encourage such tight operating margins that property owners have little recourse but to
evict tenants undergoing temporary distress. HFAs and other affordable housing funders should
also examine the eviction practices and eviction filing data for property owners who apply for
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tax credits to ensure that they are not subsidizing landlords that engage in damaging serial filing
practices, specifically in cities like Atlanta (Immergluck et al., 2019). Finally, while tenantlandlord law and variations in eviction processes across states and cities are beyond the scope of
this article, the findings do suggest that some substantial policy reform in this arena might be
necessary if the goal is to substantially reduce evictions and improve housing stability for
working families.
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Table 1. Project Data Table
Data Source

Data Item

Variables

Eviction Court Records
Sales Records

Eviction Filing Rate
Sale in Same Year
Sale in Previous Year
Sale 2-3 Years Prior

Fulton County Magistrate Court
Gwinnett County Magistrate Court
Clayton County Magistrate Court
Cobb County Magistrate Court
Dekalb County Magistrate Court
Fulton County Tax Assessor
Gwinnett County Tax Assessor
Clayton County Tax Assessor

Building Characteristics
Parcel Data

Units in Building
Value/Unit ($)
Age of Building

Subsidized Housing
Identification

Building is Subsidized

Cobb County Tax Assessor
Dekalb County Tax Assessor
National Housing Preservation
Database
U.S. Department of Housing & Urban
Development Multi-Family Contracts
Database
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Table 2. Eviction Rate Means and Independent-Sample T-Tests for Four Types of
Multifamily Rental Buildings

Building Type
Nonsenior, market-rate buildings (1,708)
Senior, market-rate buildings (4)

Mean Eviction Rate
(nonserial filing rate)
16.28 per 100 units
1.54 per 100 units

Building Type
Nonsenior, market-rate buildings (1,708)

Mean Eviction Rate
(nonserial filing rate)
16.28 per 100 units

Nonsenior-subsidized buildings (123)

18.72 per 100 units

Building Type
Nonsenior, market-rate buildings (1,708)

Mean Eviction Rate
(nonserial filing rate)
16.28 per 100 units

Senior-subsidized buildings (26)

7.55 per 100 units

Difference in Means
(significance, p-value)
+14.74 per 100 units
(0.057)**

Difference in Means
(significance, p-value)
+2.43 per 100 units
(0.090)**

Difference in Means
(significance, p-value)
- 8.73 per 100 units*
(0.000)***

* significant at p < 0.05
** equal variances assumed
***equal variances not assumed
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics
Mean

Std. Deviation

Eviction Rate (Nonserial filing rate, share of units)
Units in Building
Value/Unit ($)
Sale in Same Year (0,1)
Sale in Previous Year (0,1)
Sale 2-3 Years Prior (0,1)

0.1630
198.3
67,050
0.0862
0.1529
0.2430

0.1536
165.3
66,899
0.2808
0.3600
0.4290

Age of Building (years)
BG Share, Renters Who are Cost-Burdened
BG Median Gross Rent ($)
BG Share in Poverty
BG Share, Female-Headed Families as Share HHs
BG Share, Over 25 w/College Education
BG Share, Households w/Children <17
BG Share, Renters >16 Who are 65+
BG Share, Renters Who are Black
BG Share, Renters Who are Latino

35.94
0.5064
983.1
0.2124
0.1795
0.3511
0.2956
0.0883
0.5461
0.1280

19.00
0.1539
213.2
0.1692
0.1223
0.2331
0.1495
0.1002
0.3098
0.1744

BG Share, Renters Who are Asian
Building is Affordable (0,1)
Building is Senior-market-rate (0,1)
Building is Nonsenior-subsidized (0,1)
Building is Senior-subsidized (0,1)

0.0510
0.0770
0.0022
0.0634
0.0136

0.0920
0.2667
0.0465
0.2438
0.1157

N = 1,844
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Table 4. Estimation of Eviction Filing Rate, 2016

Constant
Units in Building
Value/Unit ($)
Sale in Same Year (0,1)
Sale in Previous Year (0,1)
Sale 2-3 Years Prior (0,1)
Age of Building (years)
BG Share, Renters Who are Cost-Burdened
BG Median Gross Rent ($)
BG Share in Poverty
BG Share, Female-Headed Families as Share HHs
BG Share, Over 25 w/College Education
BG Share, Households w/Children <17
BG Share, Renters >16 Who are 65+
BG Share, Renters Who are Black
BG Share, Renters Who are Latino
BG Share, Renters Who are Asian

MODEL 1
Coefficient
SE*
0.0111
0.0523
-7.57E-05
2.20E-05
2.10E-07
1.45E-07
0.0465
0.0109
0.0441
0.0099
0.0428
0.0086
9.14E-04
2.80E-04
0.0563
0.0265
6.70E-06
2.91E-05
0.0385
0.0422
-0.0251
0.0466
-0.0595
0.0359
-0.0074
0.0364
-0.0491
0.0458
0.0884
0.0296
-0.0385
0.0315
-0.0874
0.0339

Sig.
0.832
0.001
0.148
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.001
0.034
0.818
0.361
0.590
0.097
0.838
0.284
0.003
0.222
0.010

Building is Affordable (0,1)

MODEL 2
Coefficient
SE*
0.0153
0.0519
-7.50E-05
0.0000
2.04E-07
0.0000
0.0448
0.0109
0.0430
0.0098
0.0412
0.0084
8.38E-04 2.77E-04
0.0598
0.0266
4.66E-06 2.90E-05
0.0400
0.0423
-0.0200
0.0466
-0.0569
0.0356
-0.0024
0.0367
-0.0450
0.0461
0.0879
0.0297
-0.0402
0.0316
-0.0901
0.0341
-0.0282
0.0087

Building is Senior-market-rate (0,1)

Coefficient
0.0245
-7.65E-05
1.90E-07
0.0452
0.0425
0.0413
7.47E-04
0.0629
8.57E-07
0.0373
-0.0257
-0.0558
-0.0080
-0.0297
0.0890
-0.0401
-0.0912
-0.1373
-0.0135
-0.1065

Building is Nonsenior-subsidized (0,1)
Building is Senior-subsidized (0,1)

N= 1,844
R-square

Sig.
0.769
0.001
0.171
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.003
0.025
0.872
0.344
0.668
0.111
0.948
0.329
0.003
0.204
0.008
0.001

0.2976

0.2997

MODEL 3
SE*
0.0519
2.17E-05
1.52E-07
0.0109
0.0098
0.0083
2.80E-04
0.0263
2.90E-05
0.0427
0.0466
0.0364
0.0365
0.0438
0.0296
0.0316
0.0339

Sig.
0.637
0.000
0.212
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.008
0.017
0.976
0.382
0.581
0.126
0.827
0.498
0.003
0.205
0.007

.
-0.082
0.083
0.083
0.100
0.115
0.092
0.063
0.001
0.041
-0.020
-0.085
-0.008
-0.019
0.179
-0.046
-0.055

0.0438
0.0089
0.0168

0.002
0.131
0.000

-0.042
-0.021
-0.080

0.3051

*clustered (at block group), robust standard errors
Not shown: 35 spatial fixed-effect dummies indicating super district area within metropolitan area
Bold and underlined = significant < 0.01; bold = significant < 0.05; underlined = significant
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Figure 1. Map of Multifamily Rental Properties in the Five-County Atlanta Metropolitan
Area

0

i

Nonserial eviction filings are those filings that exclude repeat filings on the same tenant

within a one-year period. Serial filings are those that are filed on the same tenant within the same
period. Immergluck et al. (2019) show that the two different types of eviction filings exhibit
somewhat distinct patterns across buildings and neighborhoods. Nonserial filings are more likely
to result in the actual forced expulsion of a tenant from a rental unit.
ii

For Fulton County, instead of using 2016 appraised values, 2017 values were used.

Fulton County did not reassess properties from 2011 through 2016, so 2017 appraised values
were deemed more accurate estimates of 2016 market values than 2016 appraised values.
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